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Abstract:  I  investigate  the  effect  of  ratification  of  different  human  rights  treaties  adopted  by  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  on  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA)  by  donors  of  the 
OECD  Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC).  On  average  the  ratification  of  an  additional 
human rights treaty increases total ODA by 6% (around 33.5 million USD) and the ratification of one 
of the two most important treaties, on torture and civil and political rights, increases total ODA by up 
to  19%  (around  97million  USD).  Additionally  I  show  that  countries  with  low  human  rights 
compliance  can  use  treaty  ratification  as  a  substitute  for  actual  improvements  in  their  protection  of 
human  rights.  While  ratification  of  the  two  most  important  treaties  does  not  increase  ODA  for 
countries with low levels of respect for human rights, it increases aid commitments for those countries 
with  the  lowest  respect  for  human  rights  by  almost  42%.  This  pattern  does  not  significantly  differ 






















and  Tsutsui,  2007,  Neumayer,  2005).  On  the  one  hand,  states  with  a  strong  civil  society  and  a 
democratically accountable government show improvements in their respect for human rights after the 
ratification  of  international  human  rights  conventions  (Neumayer,  2005).  On  the  other  hand,  those 
states with oppressive governments – where a change in attitude would be most needed – fail to adjust 
their  behavior  (Hafner-Burton  and  Tsutsui,  2007).  This  suggests  that  countries  ratify  these 
international laws without the intent or possibility of compliance.  
Consequentially  the  question  arises:  Why  do  countries  actually  sign  these  conventions? 
Apparently, benefits must be connected with treaty ratification that convince countries to ratify even if 










the  literature,2  the  effect  of  human  rights  treaty  ratification  on  ODA  –  which  might  be  a  strong 




at  home?  Though  the  first  question  is  of  interest  as  it  analyzes  the  question  why  countries  ratify 
international human rights  treaties  in general,  the second question  is  even more important due  to  its 
high policy relevance. Empirical studies have shown that countries with low democratic standards do 









the  International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and  the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment seems to matter most. The ratification 
of one additional convention of this group is rewarded with an increase in ODA of 11 - 19%. Further, I 
show  that  international  commitment  is  most  probably  seen  as  a  substitute  to  actual  good  behavior. 
Those countries with the highest level of human rights abuses benefit most from ratifying international 
treaties. Countries  in a situation where political  terror,  including  torture,  murder and disappearances 
are a part of daily life can increase their ODA by around 18.5% on average by ratifying an additional 
                                                             
2 For example on US aid allocation by Poe and Sirirangsi (1994), Apodaca and Stohl (1999) and Demirell-Pegg 







core  human  rights  treaty.  When  analyzing  the  most  important  DAC  donors  and  the  so-called  like-
minded donors separately,  their behavior appears to be very similar. Germany, the United Kingdom, 
the  Netherlands  and  Sweden  clearly  follow  the  substitution  pattern.  For  Denmark  and  France  the 
behavior  seems  to  be  similar  however  the  results  are  not  statistically  significant.  Only  the  United 




The  remainder  of  the  study  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  discusses  the  literature  on 
commitment  to human  rights  treaties  and  how  foreign aid  allocation  is  related  to  respect  for human 
rights. Section III presents the estimation strategy and section IV the data used. In section V, I present 
and  discuss  the  findings  of  my analysis. Finally  section  VI provides  a  conclusion and discusses  the 
policy implications drawn from the presented findings. 
II. Human Rights Commitment and Aid 
Since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  the  number  of  international  conventions  on  human  rights 
together with the number of states ratifying them has steadily increased. In the UN treaty database4 a 
total  of  sixteen  conventions  are  listed  which  are  further  extended  by  additional  protocols  and 
amendments. The rights covered within these treaties  range from the prevention of genocide and the 
rights for different groups such as women, children or migrants to the general protection and provision 
of  civil  and  political  rights.  After  a  treaty  is  adopted  by  the  UN  General  Assembly,  member  states 
have the option to sign and then ratify it. In general, signing a treaty is a non-binding action that shows 
a  willingness  to  commit  to  the  agreed  standards  in  the  future.  For  a  convention  to  become  legally 
binding,  a  state  has  to  ratify  the  convention.  The  same  degree  of  formal  commitment  involves 
accession or succession to a treaty.5 In the following I will only use the term ratification, referring to 
ratification, succession and accession alike. Though ratification signals a legally binding commitment 
                                                             
4 I will focus in my study only on the conventions adopted by the United Nations as they can be ratified by all 
UN members alike.  





Burton,  2005).  Usually  a  supervisory  body  is  established  that  monitors  the  implementation  of  the 
respective convention based on regular implementation reports of the ratifying countries.6 In addition, 
individuals can report misbehavior of their government to the supervisory body if the government does 
not  comply  with  a  ratified  convention.  However  there  is  no  sanctioning  mechanism  to  enforce  the 
implementation.7  
This  lack of  enforcement  might  be one  reason  why,  despite  these  numerous  treaties,  human 
rights abuses are still regularly reported. The persistent occurrence of human rights violations suggests 
that  either  international  commitment  to  human  rights  has  not  changed  the  behavior  of  committing 
governments or that those countries that abuse human rights simply prefer to not ratify these treaties. 
A look at the list of committing countries clearly shows that the latter does not hold. The Convention 





For  47  countries  that  ratified  the  CAT,  torture  was  practiced  frequently  at  the  time  of 
ratification  (Figure  1).  Vreeland  (2008)  also  shows  that  among  dictators,  those  who  use  torture  are 
actually more likely to join the CAT than those who do not use torture. He argues that torture is more 
common in multi-party systems and governments  in these systems need to make some concession to 
their  opponents,  where  the  ratification  of  the  CAT  might  be  a  less  binding  one.  Accordingly  the 
probability  to  sign,  accede  or  ratify  the  International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and/or the CAT is almost the same between human rights repressors and protectors (Hafner-
Burton  and  Tsutsui,  2007).  These  findings  suggest  that  the  missing  improvement  in  human  rights 
                                                             




that  sanctions and  thus  coercion  of  these  norms  would  derogate  the  actual  willingness  to  commit  to human 





Political  and  law  scientists  have  intensively  studied  the  questions  of  who  ratifies HRTs and 
what  determines  their  compliance  (e.g.,  Hathaway,  2002,  2007,  Powell  and  Staton,  2009,  Conrad, 
2013).  This  literature  suggests  that  formal  commitment  to  international  conventions  does  not 
necessarily  change  a  state’s  behavior.  In  contrast,  countries  ratifying  international  human  rights 
conventions often show even  lower  compliance with  the respective rights  than countries  that do not 
ratify (Hathaway, 2002). However the changes in governments’ behavior are not homogenous between 
different  HRTs.  According  to  a  study  by  Hill  (2010),  the  ratification  has  a  positive  impact  on  the 
respect  for women’s  rights  in  the  case  of  the Convention Against Discrimination of Women Rights, 
while countries ratifying the CAT are even more likely to use torture and deteriorate their behavior.  
The decision to commit to an international treaty depends on both the will of the executives as 
well  as  the  power  of  civil  society  and  the  legislatures  at  home.  In  the  case  countries  face  a  strong 
legislative  that  does  not  share  their  view  on  protecting  human  rights,  the  commitment  to  an 
international  convention  can  be  used  as  an  instrument  to  force  the  legislative  to  introduce  the 
respective  laws  (Hathaway, 2007). On  the  other hand  if  the  executives do  not want  to  comply  with 
international standards, a powerful legislature could prevent the executives from ratifying international 
treaties (Conrad, 2013). This also applies if executives face a strong civil society at home who might 
hold  them  accountable  for  their  international  commitments  (Neumayer  2005,  Hafner-Burton  and 
Tsutsui,  2005).  Consequently,  executives  that  are  unsure  about  their  ability  to  comply  with  the 
international commitment will not ratify a convention especially  if they are confronted with a strong 
civil  society  or  legislatures  at  home.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  pressure  at  home  is  not  intense,  the 
executives  can  commit  to  the  treaty  without  fearing  enforcement  pressure  due  to  the  international 
community  lacking  a  real  enforcement  mechanism  (as  mentioned  previously).  Yet,  Hathaway’s 













in  total  bi-  and  multilateral  aid  allocation  to  be  relatively  minor  compared  to  other  indicators  like 
colonial  past  or  need.  Nevertheless,  human  rights  seem  to  play  an  important  role  in  the  allocation 
decision for some donors, e.g., Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Svensson, 1999). In a recent 
study, Nielsen (2013) finds that the effect of human rights violations on aid decisions might be more 
complex  than  previously  shown.  He  argues  that  the  importance  of  human  rights  for  aid  allocation 
depends on  the recipient’s political  importance  to  the donor as well as on  the  importance of human 
rights violations to the general public. Consequently, political allies are less likely to be punished for 
human  rights  violations  than  non-allies.  Additionally,  donors  react  to  external  pressure  –  such  as 





participation  in  HRTs  as  a  reliable  signal  for  the  willingness  of  countries  to  improve  their  human 
rights behavior and reward the governments for changing their perception of this issue. Looking from 
a political economy perspective,  the treaty ratification indicator could also be useful  in another way. 
Special  political  or  commercial  interests  in  countries  with  a  bad  human  rights  reputation  make  it 







low costs,  ratifying HRTs  is an  easy way for a government  to  improve  its  image. This  is  of special 
interest for governments that are known as having a history of human rights violations. Possibly, the 
donor perceives ratification even as a promise for behavioral change and values the treaty ratification 
more  than  the  actual  behavior.  In  this  case  HRT  ratification  serves  as  a  substitute  for  actual  good 
behavior.  
In the following, I will analyze weather i) DAC donors give more aid to countries that show a 
higher  commitment  in  terms of  international HRT ratification and  ii) whether HRT ratification is  in 
the  eyes  of  the  donors  a  substitute  or  a  complement  to  a  country’s  actual  human  rights  behavior. 
Treaty  ratification  would  be  a  complement  if  donors  reward  it  in  cases  where  the  country  already 
shows a certain respect for human rights at home. HRT ratification would be seen as a substitute when 
donors  reward  countries  for  their  international  commitment  despite  a  situation  of  frequent  human 
rights abuses at home.  




the  UN  and  therefore  able  to  ratify  HRTs.  The  estimation  model  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  HRT 
ratification on ODA is: 
(1)			   	    ,  = 	    +       ,    +      ,    +     ,    +    +    +   ,  
All  control  variables  relating  to  country  i,  treaty  ratification  (HRT),  the  recipient  country’s  human 
rights situation at home (HR) and a set of additional control variables (X), are lagged by one period to 
account  for  the  time  needed  to  acquire  information  that  can  be  used  in  aid  allocation  decisions.9 
Country  (  )  and  year  fixed  effects  (  )  are  included  to  control  for  time-invariant  country 
                                                             
8 The results are robust to using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood method. 






The  monetary  incentive  for  developing  countries  to  ratify  human  rights  treaties  has  been 
neglected  in  the  literature  so  far. To  the best  of  my knowledge,  only one  study by Magesan  (2013) 
investigates  this  question.10However, Magesan uses aid disbursements as  the dependent variable and 
thereby disregards two possible problems. First, disbursements depend not only on the situation in the 
recipient country at time t or t-1 but also on previous commitment decisions. It is therefore difficult to 
identify  the  right  timing  of  the  control  variables  to  explain  the  disbursement  decision.  The  second 
possible disadvantage  is reverse causality. It  is imaginable that the ODA disbursement  is conditional 




In  a  first  step  I  will  analyze  how  treaty  ratification  matters  for  DAC  donors’  aid  allocation 
decisions.  Based  on  this  analysis  I  want  to  focus  on  the  question  whether  rulers  in  developing 
countries can use  these  international  treaties as a supplement for  real  respect for human rights. This 
would suggest  that countries with a bad reputation  in  terms of human rights protection at  home can 
“polish” their image by ratifying HRTs and thereby  increase their aid inflows. The alternative would 
be that HRT ratification is a complement to actual behavior and only matters if a recipient also keeps a 






                                                             
10 Magesan finds evidence that DAC aid increases after a country commits to international HRTs. As his group 
of  human  rights  treaties  differs  from  the  one  I  analyze  and  he  further  measures  treaty  ratification  as  the 





(2)		Log	ODA ,  = β  + β HRT    + β HR    + β HRT    ∗ HR   	+β X    + γ  + δ  + ε ,  
Empirical  studies  do  not  find  much  evidence  for  selectivity  of  bilateral  aid  donors  with  respect  to 
institutional  settings  (e.g.,  Dollar  and  Levin,  2006).  Accordingly,  if  donors  do  not  take  general 
institutional changes into account in their allocation decision, the risk of an omitted variable bias due 







respective  recipient  (Neumayer  and  Plümper,  2010)  as  well  as  a  country’s  ratifying  behavior  with 
respect  to  a  different  but  comparable  set  of  treaties.  The  first  instrument  assumes  that  neighboring 
countries’  ratification  behavior  affects  the  behavior  of  recipient  i.  This  assumption  is  based  on  the 
theory of Elkins and Simmons (2005), among others, and empirical evidence that shows governments 
are influenced in their decision making by the behavior of neighboring states. This finding holds true 
for  several  different  types  of  government  decisions.  Examples  include  when  adopting  economic 
reforms (Gassebner et al., 2011) or human trafficking policies (Cho et al., 2013). This spatial effect is 
arguably exogenous  to  the decision of aid commitments  to country  i as country  i’s ODA should not 
depend on the behavior of other countries.11 The second instrument I use is a country’s ratification of a 
set of six treaties  listed under the “penal matters” chapter in the UN treaties database. These treaties 
include,  for example,  the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and  the Convention 
                                                             





other countries of  the  region  in order  to keep  the  regional budget  stable  irrespective  of  the usability  of new 







on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.12 Treaties in this chapter also cover security 
aspects  and  their  content  is  therefore  to  a  certain  extent  similar  to  the  treaties  in  the  human  rights 
chapter.  Presumably a country’s ratification behavior of these two chapters is alike. On the other hand 
cover these treaties more abstract security aspects and not specific personal rights, with the exception 
of  the  UN  personnel’s  safety.    It  is  therefore  unlikely  that  donors  are  equally  sensitive  to  the 
ratification of these treaties with respect to the HRTs. This is supported by the  lack of these treaties’ 
explanatory power for the dependent variable when included directly in the ODA estimation.     
IV. Data  
The  dependent  variable  I  use  is  DAC  donors’  total  aid  commitment  in  year  t  to  recipient  i in 
logarithms.13 This information is provided by the OECD’s International Development Statistics. Given 
that the total size of ODA commitments is the outcome variable it is important to control for the size 
of  the  recipient  country  by  including  total  population  as  a  control  variable.  Following  the  previous 
literature on aid allocation, I include GDP per capita to measure the recipient’s need. This measure is 
highly  correlated  with  other  social  needs  measures  like  child  mortality  or  literacy  and  has  the 
advantage  of  being  more  widely  available  compared  to  these  measures  (Neumayer,  2003a).  In 
addition, given that the level of democracy and other state characteristics are arguably good predictors 
of the probability that a country will ratify human rights treaties (Hathaway, 2007) and donor countries 
claim  to  reward  democratic  behavior,  it  is  important  to  control  for  democracy.  Otherwise,  treaty 
ratification might capture effects that reflect the institutional quality of the recipient. I use Polity IV’s 
polity2  measure  (Marshall  and  Jaggers,  2003)  imputed  with  freedom  house’s  civil  liberties  measure 
(Teorell et al., 2011) to control for the political situation in the recipient country. The imputed measure 
has more observations than the original polity2 data and, according to Hadenius and Teorell (2005), is 
more  reliable  than  the  original  polity2  index.  To  control  for  the  donor’s  geo-strategic  interests,  the 
recipient’s voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) is included. I use voting in line with 
                                                             
12 An overview of the included treaties can be found in the appendix. 





likely  that  countries  that  vote  in  line  with  the  major  bilateral  donors  are  also  more  likely  to  sign 
international HRTs due  to  similar human  rights  protection preferences. The  effect  of  UNGA  voting 
and general political alliance could in this case be attributed to ratification when voting behavior is not 
controlled for.  
Following  the  convention  in  the  literature  I  take  two  alternative  measures  of  human  rights 
practices:  the  political  terror  scale  (PTS,  2012)  and  the  physical  integrity  index  (Cingranelli  and 
Richards,  1999).  The  political  terror  scale  measures  the  violation  of  physical  integrity  rights  in 
different countries around the world. The rights covered in this measure are those basic human rights 
that  are  enforceable  by  the  government  and  do  not  depend  on  the  general  level  of  development 
(Neumayer,  2003b). Both Amnesty  International  and  the  US  State Department  provide  this  index.  I 
use the average measure of both indices combined.15 The political terror scale ranges from 1 to 5 with 
5 representing the worst form of political terror where “Terror has expanded to the whole population. 
The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness.” (PTS,  2012).  The 
alternative  measure,  the  physical  integrity  index  provided  by  Cingranelli  and  Richards  (1999)  is  a 
combined  measure  reflecting  a  country’s  situation  with  regards  to  the  use  of  torture,  extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment and disappearance. The indicator ranges from 0 to 8, where a score of 8 
indicates  highest  respect  for  physical  integrity.  These  measures  of  actual  respect  for  human  rights 
allow me to  investigate the question whether human rights treaties are a substitute or complement to 
actual  respect  for  human  rights.  Further,  they  account  for  a  possibly  different  ratification  behavior 
between human rights abusers and protectors. 
Finally  the  main  variable  of  interest  is  the  ratification  of  HRTs.  The  commitment  to 
international human rights treaties is measured with a simple count of the number of UN HRTs that a 
country  has  signed.  The  United  Nations’  treaty  collection  lists  27  conventions,  amendments  and 
optional protocols under the chapter human rights.16 The first crude measure codes the ratification of 
                                                             







all  of  these  elements  (human rights treaties).17  However  as  this  list  includes  treaties  which  are 
probably not equally important with respect to basic human rights, e.g.,  the International Convention 
Against  Apartheid  in  Sports  versus  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights.  In  a 
second step I reduce the list of instruments therefore to the nine core treaties (core treaties) according 
to  the Office  of  the High Commissioner  for Human  Rights.18 As  a  third  indicator  the  list  of human 
rights  treaties  is  further  reduced  to  the  two  most  important  human  rights  measures  according  to  the 
vast  literature  on  human  rights  (see,  e.g.,  Hathaway,  2002,  Hafner-Burton  and  Tsutsui,  2007),  the 
International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment  (CAT)  and  the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  I  thus 
restrict my choice of human rights  treaties  to only  those  that are  internationally recognized as being 




V. Results     
Table  1  shows  the  results  for  the  basic  fixed-effects  regression.  GDP  per  capita  has  a  significantly 
negative  effect  on ODA  commitments  since  the  recipient’s  need  for  foreign aid  reduces  with  rising 
GDP per capita. In addition, the statistically significant and positive coefficient of polity suggests that 
more  democratic  countries,  on  average,  receive  more  aid.  Accordingly,  countries  that  can  improve 
their polity score by one unit receive on average around 4% more ODA. As the political terror scale 
and  the physical  integrity  index both measure human rights abuses  in  the recipient country,  they are 




the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  (ICCPR),  the  International Covenant on Economic, 





Rights  of  Persons  with  Disabilities  (CRPD).  See 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx. 
19 In contrast, Magesan (2013) also includes some treaties that belong to other categories like cultural matters. I 




included  separately.  Throughout  all  models both  measures  are  statistically  significant  at  least  at  the 
five  percent  level.  This  suggests  that  the  DAC  donors  consider  the  human  rights  situation  in  the 
recipient country when allocating their aid. While the literature so far has identified only a weak effect 
of human rights on the allocation of aid (Neumayer, 2003a,  2003b) or an influence depending on the 
political  importance  of  the  recipient  country  towards  the  donor  (Nielsen,  2013)  my  results  show  a 
stable  and  quantitatively  important  effect.  An  increase  of  political  terror  by  one  unit,  which  is 
equivalent  to one standard deviation  in  the sample,  reduces ODA commitments on average by more 
than 9% which equals around 45.5 million USD (which  is approximately  equal  to  the  total ODA to 
Costa Rica in 2009). This is an economically relevant size. On the other hand a country that manages 
to  increase  its respect for physical  integrity rights by two units, which  is again about equivalent to a 




most  general  measure  for  human  rights  treaties,  namely  all  elements  included  under  the  chapter 
“Human  Rights”  in  the  UN  treaty  collection  database.  In  both  specifications  the  coefficient  is  not 
significant  at  conventional  levels.  However  the  narrower  measure,  which  only  captures  treaties 
classified as core treaties with regards to respect for human rights, is statistically significant at the five 
percent level in model four. This suggests that ratifying an additional core treaty leads, on average, to 
a 6% rise  in ODA.  In model  five, where  the physical  integrity  index  is used  instead,  the measure  is 
again  not  significant  at  conventional  levels.  However  data  for  the  physical  integrity  index  are  only 
available for a shorter period (since 1981), therefore the number of observations reduces substantially. 










after  the  inclusion  of  the  treaty  measures.  This  shows  that  both  factors  are  of  importance  for  the 
donor’s decision. Therefore in the second step I analyze the relationship between these two measures 
asking the question whether the importance of international commitment depends on the actual respect 
for human rights at home,  i.e. whether  international  commitment  is a complement or a substitute  to 
actual  respect  for  human  rights.  Donors  might  assume  that  governments  change  their  behavior  and 
want  to  reward  countries  who  signal  their  willingness  to  improve  human  rights  standards  by  treaty 
ratification. Given the sobering empirical evidence however it is most likely that this wish, at least in 
non-democratic countries with a record of human rights violation, does not come true. If the aim is to 
reward human  rights  protection,  treaty  ratification  should  only be  rewarded  when  it  complements  a 
state’s actual behavior.  
Table 2  shows  the  results  for  the  interaction  of  treaty  ratification  with  the  two  measures  of 
respect for and abuse of human rights respectively. For the political terror scale, an increase signifies 
an  increase  in  human  rights  abuse  while  an  increase  in  the  physical  integrity  measure  means  that 
human rights are less abused. The results show two important things. First, the interaction is in almost 
all  models  statistically  significant  at  least  at  the  five  percent  level.  In  terms  of  ODA  allocation 
decisions,  this  indicates  the  existence  of  an  interaction  of  treaty  ratification  with  the  extent  of  the 
actual respect  for human  rights. Second,  the  signs  of  the  coefficients  indicate  that  treaty  ratification 
has  a  stronger  positive  effect  on  ODA  allocation  if  the  actual  protection  of  human  rights  in  the 
recipient  country  is  lower.  This  becomes  clearer  when  we  examine  the  marginal  effect  of  treaty 
ratification at different levels of political terror and physical integrity graphically in Figures A 2 – A 4. 
For lower values of the political terror scale – situations where the government respects human rights 
–  the  ratification  of  human  rights  treaties  has no additional  effect  on ODA commitments. However 
once  the  threshold  of  three  in  the political  terror  scale  is  reached,  which corresponds  to  a  situation 












physical integrity  index. As long as a country  is in the lower third of the index, it receives  increased 
international  commitments  of  ODA.  But  as  soon  as  the  country  has  reached  a  certain  level  of 
protection of physical  integrity rights, the effect of HRT ratification on ODA commitments becomes 
insignificant.  
As  discussed  before,  the  treaty  ratification  measures  might  be  endogenous.  I  therefore 
instrument  treaty  ratification  with  the  distance  weighted  average  ratification  of  the  respective  treaty 
group for all countries except country i and the number of ratified treaties with similar content. Table 3 
shows the results for the instrumented regression. The reported F-Statistic for the first stage shows the 
explanatory  power  of  the  used  instruments.  Further  the  Kleibergen-Paap  rank  test  rejects  the  null 
hypothesis  of  underidentification  meaning  that  the  instruments  would  not  be  correlated  with  the 
endogenous regressors and therefore lack explanatory power. Additionally, the Hansen J statistic does 
not  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  instruments  are  uncorrelated  with  the  error  term,  which  tests 
their exogeneity with respect to the dependent variable i.e.  their validity. The results of the previous 
regressions  are  robust  to  the  instrumentation  and  the  effect  of  international  commitment  at  different 
levels of human rights protection at home becomes stronger.  
In addition I tested a placebo regression with HRT commitment in t+1 as explanatory. Neither 





previous  regressions  using  three-year  averages  of  all  the  variables.  Again,  the  results  show  that 
ratification of HRTs is rewarded and more so in countries with a bad record of human rights abuses.  
It seems plausible that bureaucrats in bilateral aid agencies would make allocation decisions in 
such a way.  Countries  with  low political  terror  already  show a  respect  to  human  rights  while  those 




targeted  to  support  the  country’s  implementation  of  the  international  commitment.  This ODA could 
potentially help to improve their domestic human rights situation in the medium term. Aid for this aim 
would  most  likely be  directed  to  the  government and  the civil  society. To  test  whether  this  part  of 
ODA causes the observed increase, I replicate the previous regressions with a new dependent variable 
that covers only this specific aid.20 As I investigate only one part of ODA, the number of zeros in the 
dependent  variable  rises.  This  causes  a  skewed  distribution  and  OLS  might  no  longer  be  the  most 
efficient estimator. I therefore use the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) method, which 
is  known  for  its  good  performance  for  estimations  with  a  large  number  of  zeros  (Santos  Silva  and 
Tenreyro,  2006).21  The  results  (Tables  4  and  5)  suggest  that  aid  to  the  sectors  most  relevant  for 








(Neumayer,  2003b)  –  Canada,  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  Norway  and  Sweden  –  and  the  largest 







donors:  France,  Germany,  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.  While  the  former  are 
usually described as more “benevolent” donors that especially take the recipient’s need and merit into 
account,  the  latter  are  known  for  their  more  strategic  aid  giving  –  often  allocating  based  on 
commercial or political interests. I will follow this distinction of donors and analyze the bilateral aid of 
each  donor  j  to  recipient i  to  evaluate  how  their  behavior  differs  with  regards  to  the  recipient’s 
international  commitment  to  HRTs.  To  control  for  general  patterns  of  aid  allocation  by  the  DAC 
donors or “herding” behavior, as additional control variable I  include the total ODA to recipient i by 
all DAC donors except donor j. The smaller donors like Denmark have a smaller aid budget and are 
therefore  more  selective  in  their  aid  allocation,  i.e.,  the  number  of  countries  receiving  no  ODA  is 
higher than for the big donors. This leads to an increase of zero observations in the dependent variable. 
To account  for  this  skewed  distribution  I  again use  the PPML  method as  introduced above  (Santos 
Silva  and  Tenreyro,  2006).  The  advantage  of  this  method  is  that  it  does  not  require  a  two-step 
approach in order to model both the zeros and the values above zero.  
Though  the  like-minded  donors  are  usually  assumed  to  be  more  needs  and  merits  based  in 
their aid allocation, the results (Table A 1, appendix) do not show a significant effect of political terror 
on  aid  allocation.  This  is  remarkable  as  we  observe  this  effect  for  the  biggest  donors  (Table  A  2, 
appendix)  who  are  usually  assumed  to  be  more  self-interest  driven  and  care  less  for  institutional 
settings  in  their  aid  allocation  decision.  With  the  exception  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States,  the big donors provide significantly  less aid for countries with a higher political  terror scale. 
The marginal effect ranges between -.16 and -.35.5 which is equivalent to a decrease of 16 to 35.5% of 
ODA  with  an  increase  of political  terror by  one category  at  the  means  of all  other  covariates. This 
translates  to  a  reduction  of  German  ODA  commitments  on  average  by  9  million  USD  (16%),  of 
French ODA by almost  15  million  USD  (27%) and  of  Japanese ODA by 45  million  USD  (35.5%). 
Interestingly,  two  of  the  like-minded  countries  (Canada  and  Sweden)  react  to  the  recipient’s 
international commitment to HRTs but they do not consider the political terror in the country.  





on bilateral aid allocation. These figures are based on  the results of Tables 8 and 9.    In general,  the 




record  of human  rights  protection benefit  from  international  commitment,  those  with  high  levels  of 
domestic political terror cannot increase their Japanese ODA inflows by ratifying HRTs. However, the 
interaction  is  almost  always  statistically  insignificant.  It  is  only  for  the  core  treaties  group  that  the 
positive  impact of HRT ratification on ODA commitments for countries with  low  levels of political 
terror is significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless the Japanese allocation decision is remarkably 
different from those of the other donors analyzed.  
In  the  group  of  Nordic  countries,  the  interaction  pattern  is  statistically  significant  for  the 
Netherlands  and  Sweden.  For  Sweden  the  effect  becomes  significant  at  a  relatively  low  level  of 
political  terror.  It  seems  that  Sweden  rewards  the  commitment  to  HRT  in  general  and  not  only  for 
those  countries  with  poor  protection  of  human  rights  at  home.  A  similar  pattern  is  observable  for 
Germany and the United Kingdom. For the US, on the other hand, international commitment seems to 
be  unimportant  independently  of  the  domestic  political  terror  situation.  Again  this  contradicts  the 




ratification of HRTs  in general  for  their aid allocation decisions. Further,  in both groups  the general 








bilateral  donors  to base  their  aid  allocation  decision  on  the  human  rights  situation  in  the  respective 
country.  One  easily  available  measure  for  a  country’s  formal  commitment  to  human  rights  is  its 
participation  in  international  human  rights  treaties.  This  study  shows  that  DAC  donors  take  a 
recipient’s ratification of these treaties into account in their aid allocation decisions. However, it is not 
only  treaty  ratification  that  is  considered  but  also  the  actual  human  rights  situation  in  the  recipient 
country.  At  first  sight  it  seems  reasonable  to  reward  countries  for  their  ratification  of  these 
international  conventions.  Yet  the  data  suggest  that  those  governments  who  abuse  human  rights  at 
home  can  benefit  through  increased  ODA  from  DAC  donors  by  ratifying  international  HRTs. This 
reward is probably built on the hope that the formal commitment will indeed change the government’s 
actual  behavior.  However,  history  has  shown  that  this  hope  is  often  not  fulfilled.  This  implies  that 
donors  reward  countries  with  poor  human  rights  protection  simply  for  signaling  intents  that  these 
countries  do  not  realize,  because  they  lack  political  will  or  capacity.  Therefore  if  donors  want  to 
sincerely  account  for  human  rights  in  their  aid  allocation  decision  they  should  primarily  rely  on 
information of the actual human rights situation in the recipient country provided by organizations like 
Amnesty International. Further, when rewarding countries for their international commitment, donors 
should wait until a real improvement  is observable  instead of providing benefits  in the hope that the 
situation  will  ameliorate.  This  included  also  the  recommendation  to  make  treaty  ratification  not  a 
condition of aid commitments as ratification does not necessarily imply implementation. On the other 
hand  if  donors  take  this  international  commitment  seriously  they  should  increase  the  amount  of aid 
that  is  guided  towards  supporting  the  government  in  the  implementation  of  its  international 
commitments.  This  study  shows  that  currently  this  type  of  aid  does  not  increase  after  a  country 
commits to international human rights conventions.  
This  finding  has  important  ramifications  for  policy  decisions  as  the  current  pattern  of 
rewarding  specifically  those  countries  with  bad  human  rights  record  for  international  commitment 
implicitly  means  that  oppressive  regimes  are  rewarded  for  their  window  dressing  behavior. 
Interestingly I cannot find a difference in this behavior between the Nordic donors, that are known for 




of  human  rights  protection  for  their  commitment  to  international  human  rights  treaties.  Given  the 
empirical  evidence  on  the  lack  of  compliance  with  HRTs,  Japan’s  strategy  seems  to  be  the  best  in 
terms of giving based on actual respect for human rights. As a next step  it would be of  interest and 
policy  relevance  to  investigate  whether  human-rights-targeted  aid  might  indeed  help  to  implement 
international  commitments  on  human  rights  protection.  If  this  type  of  aid  changes  a  government’s 
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Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Treaties Ratification on ODA at different levels of Political Terror 
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Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table II.2. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence











GDP p.c. t-1 0.011 [0.971] -0.228 [0.216] 0.011 [0.971] -0.263 [0.163] 0.014 [0.964] -0.252 [0.175] 0.011 [0.972] -0.246 [0.179]
Population t-1 0.176 [0.644] -0.344 [0.516] 0.173 [0.647] -0.240 [0.652] 0.169 [0.653] -0.263 [0.619] 0.144 [0.699] -0.328 [0.522]
Polity t-1 0.032 [0.113] 0.052*** [0.007] 0.026 [0.211] 0.050*** [0.006] 0.023 [0.272] 0.048*** [0.006] 0.021 [0.294] 0.043** [0.012]
UNGA voting t-1 3.293** [0.011] 3.237*** [0.008] 3.076** [0.012] 2.661** [0.017] 3.149** [0.011] 2.720** [0.017] 3.115** [0.014] 2.633** [0.021]
Political Terror t-1 -0.091*** [0.008] -0.091*** [0.008] -0.098*** [0.005] -0.100*** [0.004]
Physical Integrity t-1 0.029* [0.065] 0.032** [0.038] 0.034** [0.030] 0.034** [0.026]
Human Rights 
Treaties t-1 0.035 [0.108] 0.024 [0.368]
Core Treaties t-1 0.067* [0.062] 0.046 [0.280]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.116* [0.058] 0.193*** [0.001]
Core Treaties excl. 
ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.035 [0.591] -0.050 [0.418]
Constant 13.703** [0.018] 23.788*** [0.007] 13.843** [0.016] 22.777** [0.011] 13.855** [0.015] 23.020** [0.010] 14.303** [0.014] 24.124*** [0.005]
Observations 3,631 3,001 3,631 2,913 3,631 2,913 3,631 2,913
Countries 136 142 136 134 136 134 136 134
R-squared 0.057 0.051 0.060 0.058 0.061 0.058 0.062 0.064
Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are included. The standard
errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
(7)(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8)(2)
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Table 2: Interaction of Treaty Ratification with Human Rights Respect, 1977-2010, OLS 
 
  
GDP p.c. t-1 -0.233* [0.069] -0.298 [0.117] -0.231* [0.061] -0.207 [0.259] -0.299** [0.024] -0.228 [0.219]
Population t-1 0.088 [0.801] -0.465 [0.349] 0.103 [0.764] -0.534 [0.285] -0.039 [0.916] -0.558 [0.276]
Polity t-1 0.046*** [0.009] 0.061*** [0.003] 0.042** [0.013] 0.056*** [0.004] 0.034** [0.048] 0.047** [0.015]
UNGA voting t-1 0.081 [0.151] 0.077 [0.211] 0.084 [0.139] 0.101 [0.123] 0.088 [0.126] 0.094 [0.152]
Political Terror t-1 -0.306*** [0.000] -0.306*** [0.001] -0.202*** [0.001]
Physical Integrity t-1 0.150*** [0.003] 0.138** [0.012] 0.073** [0.038]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 -0.062** [0.020] 0.110** [0.030]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 * Political Terror t-1 0.036*** [0.001]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 -0.018*** [0.007]
Core Treaties t-1 -0.086* [0.060] 0.159* [0.059]
Core Treaties t-1 * Political Terror t-1 0.054*** [0.006]
Core Treaties t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 -0.025** [0.026]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.094 [0.468] 0.325** [0.030]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 * Political Terror t-1 0.103** [0.021]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 -0.035 [0.173]
Constant 19.369*** [0.001] 27.297*** [0.001] 19.135*** [0.001] 28.169*** [0.001] 21.558*** [0.001] 28.538*** [0.001]
Observations 3,574 2,862 3,574 2,941 3,591 2,951
Countries 133 131 133 138 133 138
R-squared 0.080 0.071 0.077 0.056 0.067 0.054
Notes: T he dependent variable is Log T otal ODA Commitments by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are included. The standard errors are
clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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GDP p.c. t-1 0.057 [0.843] -0.324* [0.083] -0.206 [0.260] -0.242 [0.175] 0.075 [0.811] -0.195 [0.289]
Population t-1 -0.054 [0.886] -0.390 [0.433] -0.525 [0.287] -0.374 [0.425] -0.319 [0.443] -0.601 [0.194]
Polity t-1 0.023 [0.256] 0.044** [0.026] 0.040** [0.050] 0.040** [0.045] 0.012 [0.631] 0.020 [0.408]
UNGA voting t-1 3.197** [0.012] 2.575** [0.028] 2.524** [0.019] 2.734** [0.013] 3.302** [0.012] 2.361** [0.040]
Political Terror t-1 -0.524*** [0.000] -0.568*** [0.000] -0.518*** [0.001]
Physical Integrity t-1 0.225*** [0.000] 0.251*** [0.000] 0.222*** [0.000]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 -0.103 [0.145] 0.259*** [0.000]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 * Political Terror t-1 0.075*** [0.000]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 -0.031*** [0.000]
Core Treaties t-1 -0.132 [0.294] 0.396*** [0.000]
Core Treaties t-1 * Political Terror t-1 0.118*** [0.000]
Core Treaties t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 -0.053*** [0.000]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.760* [0.091] 1.341*** [0.000]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 * Political Terror t-1 0.429*** [0.003]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 -0.173*** [0.000]
Observations 3,627 2,909 2,909 2,909 3,627 2,909
Countries 134 132 132 132 134 132
Partial R²
F-Test First Stage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen (p-value) 0.666 0.823 0.293 0.360 0.783 0.835
Kleiberg-Paap F-Statistic 17.14 11.49 10.44 10.45 9.770 5.042
Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are included. All treaty ratification measures are instrumented by a
distance w eighted spatial measure of treaty ratification of all other countries and the ratificatoin of treaties under the "penalty matters" chapter of the UN treaty database. The first partial R² value refers to the
treaty measures instrument and the second to the interaction-instrument. The f irst stage F-Test controls for the pow er of the instruments in the first stage. The Hansen (p-value) refers to the validity of the
instruments w hich cannot be rejected. The Kleiberg-Paap F-Statistic rejects the hypothesis of underidentification of the endogenous variables. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in
brackets, w here ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.1098; 0.2991 0.0973; 0.3504 0.0862; 0.2123 0.0841; 0.2682 0.0884; 0.1734 0.0616; 0.1328
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GDP p.c. t-1 -0.368* [0.086] -0.374* [0.087] -0.567** [0.028] -0.367* [0.084] -0.561** [0.026] -0.363* [0.088] -0.557** [0.024]
Population t-1 -0.169 [0.820] -0.151 [0.840] -0.604 [0.462] -0.177 [0.812] -0.617 [0.450] -0.027 [0.971] -0.490 [0.558]
Polity t-1 0.058* [0.059] 0.057* [0.060] 0.044 [0.152] 0.057* [0.061] 0.044 [0.150] 0.059* [0.054] 0.044 [0.151]
UNGA voting t-1 -1.278* [0.064] -1.282* [0.065] -0.950 [0.258] -1.260* [0.064] -0.947 [0.256] -1.207* [0.078] -0.859 [0.309]
Political Terror t-1 0.205*** [0.000] 0.206*** [0.000] 0.206*** [0.000] 0.205*** [0.000]
Physical Integrity t-1 -0.045** [0.025] -0.045** [0.027] -0.044** [0.033]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 0.005 [0.819] 0.004 [0.881]
Core Treaties t-1 0.013 [0.749] 0.003 [0.942]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.101 [0.242] -0.104 [0.270]
Core Treaties except ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.071 [0.161] 0.057 [0.279]
Constant 7.855 [0.531] 7.549 [0.548] 16.865 [0.225] 7.902 [0.528] 17.061 [0.218] 5.243 [0.681] 14.766 [0.296]
Observations 1,853 1,853 1,752 1,853 1,752 1,853 1,752
Countries 119 119 119 119 119 119 119
R-squared 0.532 0.532 0.515 0.532 0.515 0.533 0.516
(7)
Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments to the Government and Civil Society Sector by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country f ixed effects and year dummies are included. The
standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, w here ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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GDP p.c. t-1 -0.368* [0.086] -0.367* [0.091] -0.528** [0.044] -0.367* [0.085] -0.549** [0.030] -0.367* [0.088] -0.556** [0.029]
Population t-1 -0.169 [0.820] 0.026 [0.973] -0.498 [0.560] -0.135 [0.860] -0.583 [0.485] -0.103 [0.896] -0.539 [0.524]
Polity t-1 0.058* [0.059] 0.056* [0.064] 0.044 [0.152] 0.057* [0.060] 0.045 [0.147] 0.059* [0.054] 0.046 [0.140]
UNGA voting t-1 -1.278* [0.064] -1.411** [0.044] -1.027 [0.216] -1.290* [0.058] -0.945 [0.256] -1.290* [0.061] -0.943 [0.264]
Political Terror t-1 0.205*** [0.000]0.354*** [0.006] 0.286 [0.101] 0.210** [0.031]
Physical Integrity t-1 0.052 [0.154] -0.022 [0.584]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 -0.094 [0.116] -0.081 [0.330] -0.053 [0.287]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 * Political Terror t-1 -0.017 [0.167]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 0.006 [0.361]
Core Treaties t-1 0.054 [0.493] -0.026 [0.758]
Core Treaties t-1 * Political Terror t-1 -0.015 [0.599]
Core Treaties t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 0.007 [0.639]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.042 [0.802] -0.092 [0.567]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 * Political Terror t-1 -0.004 [0.937]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 * Physical Integrity t-1 0.006 [0.832]
Constant 7.855 [0.531] 4.258 [0.751] 15.131 [0.294] 7.007 [0.591] 16.562 [0.238] 6.825 [0.608] 15.859 [0.268]
Observations 1,853 1,853 1,752 1,853 1,752 1,853 1,752
Countries 119 119 119 119 119 119 119
R-squared 0.532 0.532 0.515 0.532 0.515 0.532 0.515
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Notes: The dependent variable is Log Total ODA Commitments to the Government and Civil Society Sector by all DAC Donors in constant USD. Country fixed effects and year dummies are
































































































































1 2 3 4 5
Political Terror Scale
Histogram Political Terror
Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.3. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows
the percentaged distribution of political terror.
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1 2 3 4 5
Political Terror Scale
Histogram Political Terror
Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.4. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows
the percentaged distribution of political terror.
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1 2 3 4 5
Political Terror Scale
Histogram Political Terror
Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.3. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows
the percentaged distribution of political terror.
 36 
 



























































































































1 2 3 4 5
Political Terror Scale
Histogram Political Terror
Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.4. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows
the percentaged distribution of political terror.
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1 2 3 4 5
Political Terror Scale
Histogram Political Terror
Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.3. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows
the percentaged distribution of political terror.
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1 2 3 4 5
Political Terror Scale
Histogram Political Terror
Notes: Plots are based on results presented in Table A II.4. The dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence interval. The histogram shows
the percentaged distribution of political terror.
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Table A 1: Bilateral Aid like-minded countries, PPML, marginal effects 
 
  
GDP p.c. t-1 -0.740 [0.177] -0.739 [0.178] -0.739 [0.178] -0.749 [0.172] 0.338 [0.413] 0.322 [0.430] 0.333 [0.413] 0.342 [0.399]
Population t-1 -0.510 [0.756] -0.526 [0.750] -0.526 [0.751] -0.685 [0.685] 1.238 [0.476] 1.193 [0.493] 1.229 [0.480] 1.305 [0.457]
Polity t-1 0.005 [0.929] 0.003 [0.961] 0.003 [0.965] -0.009 [0.877] 0.004 [0.959] 0.006 [0.926] 0.005 [0.945] 0.011 [0.870]
DAC aid t-1 0.872*** [0.000] 0.872*** [0.000] 0.872*** [0.000] 0.856*** [0.000] 1.180*** [0.000] 1.181*** [0.000] 1.180*** [0.000] 1.188*** [0.000]
UNGA voting t-1 5.620*** [0.005] 5.567*** [0.004] 5.596*** [0.004] 5.503*** [0.005] 5.029** [0.030] 5.162** [0.028] 5.055** [0.031] 5.021** [0.032]
Political Terror t-1 -0.197 [0.178] -0.196 [0.182] -0.199 [0.171] -0.209 [0.147] -0.225 [0.109] -0.229 [0.105] -0.224 [0.108] -0.219 [0.116]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 0.016 [0.794] -0.029 [0.604]
Core Treaties t-1 0.023 [0.838] -0.012 [0.894]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.344* [0.091] -0.135 [0.580]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.193 [0.258] 0.071 [0.681]
Observations 3,564 3,564 3,564 3,564 3,163 3,163 3,163 3,163
R-squared 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.600 0.514 0.514 0.514 0.514
GDP p.c. t-1 -0.168 [0.865] -0.152 [0.878] -0.153 [0.878] -0.139 [0.889] -2.301*** [0.000] -2.297*** [0.000] -2.286*** [0.000] -2.277*** [0.000]
Population t-1 5.105* [0.058] 5.135* [0.053] 5.072* [0.057] 5.246** [0.049] -3.682* [0.083] -3.582* [0.087] -3.668* [0.083] -3.565* [0.091]
Polity t-1 0.039 [0.634] 0.018 [0.825] 0.019 [0.810] 0.028 [0.716] -0.091 [0.266] -0.100 [0.218] -0.101 [0.214] -0.096 [0.235]
DAC aid t-1 1.221*** [0.000] 1.213*** [0.000] 1.210*** [0.000] 1.218*** [0.000] 0.660*** [0.000] 0.661*** [0.000] 0.659*** [0.000] 0.669*** [0.000]
UNGA voting t-1 -2.194 [0.457] -2.925 [0.312] -2.529 [0.390] -2.484 [0.396] 2.976 [0.143] 2.694 [0.180] 2.801 [0.163] 2.784 [0.168]
Political Terror t-1 0.177 [0.313] 0.180 [0.303] 0.161 [0.356] 0.169 [0.331] -0.114 [0.519] -0.109 [0.543] -0.120 [0.492] -0.115 [0.510]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 0.155 [0.126] 0.069 [0.333]
Core Treaties t-1 0.175 [0.219] 0.096 [0.483]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.087 [0.764] -0.056 [0.853]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.354 [0.114] 0.198 [0.314]
Observations 3,592 3,592 3,592 3,592 3,524 3,524 3,524 3,524
R-squared 0.580 0.581 0.581 0.581 0.600 0.601 0.601 0.601
GDP p.c. t-1 -3.503*** [0.001] -3.456*** [0.001] -3.383*** [0.002] -3.385*** [0.002]
Population t-1 3.367 [0.284] 3.821 [0.197] 3.494 [0.243] 3.481 [0.242]
Polity t-1 0.158 [0.250] 0.120 [0.386] 0.106 [0.441] 0.105 [0.447]
DAC aid t-1 0.658*** [0.001] 0.690*** [0.000] 0.670*** [0.000] 0.669*** [0.000]
UNGA voting t-1 -1.532 [0.565] -2.546 [0.315] -2.161 [0.410] -2.166 [0.409]
Political Terror t-1 -0.085 [0.706] -0.059 [0.793] -0.114 [0.608] -0.115 [0.606]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 0.275** [0.022]
Core Treaties t-1 0.466** [0.017]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.483 [0.293]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.455* [0.079]
Observations 3,244 3,244 3,244 3,244
R-squared 0.528 0.533 0.532 0.532
(14) (15) (16)
Notes: Dependent variable is bilateral aid commitment. Shown are the
marginal effects at the mean of all other covariates. UNGA voting refers
to the voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly between
the recipient and the respctive donor. DAC aid is the total aid of all DAC
donors except the respective donor whose aid is analyzed. The
estimation method is Poisson Pseude-Maximum-Likelihood to account
for excess zeros in the dependent variable. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. P-values in brackets, where ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Netherlands Norway
Sweden
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Canada Denmark
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
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Table A 2: Bilateral Aid important DAC countries, PPML, marginal effects 
 
GDP p.c. t-1 -0.369 [0.485] -0.363 [0.491] -0.361 [0.496] -0.372 [0.483] 0.161 [0.695] 0.162 [0.693] 0.161 [0.695] 0.162 [0.693]
Population t-1 -0.440 [0.647] -0.388 [0.688] -0.419 [0.664] -0.544 [0.574] -4.978*** [0.002] -4.982*** [0.002] -4.978*** [0.002] -4.966*** [0.002]
Polity t-1 -0.011 [0.719] -0.025 [0.421] -0.025 [0.419] -0.033 [0.296] 0.056 [0.267] 0.059 [0.251] 0.056 [0.282] 0.057 [0.280]
DAC aid t-1 0.434*** [0.000] 0.427*** [0.000] 0.427*** [0.000] 0.418*** [0.000] 0.457*** [0.000] 0.458*** [0.000] 0.457*** [0.000] 0.458*** [0.000]
UNGA voting t-1 2.016* [0.071] 1.690 [0.133] 1.883* [0.095] 1.816 [0.107] 3.286* [0.062] 3.367* [0.056] 3.286* [0.062] 3.296* [0.059]
Political Terror t-1 -0.165** [0.021] -0.164** [0.023] -0.176** [0.012] -0.184*** [0.008] -0.275*** [0.002] -0.275*** [0.002] -0.275*** [0.002] -0.274*** [0.003]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 0.084** [0.012] -0.017 [0.744]
Core Treaties t-1 0.103** [0.040] 0.000 [0.996]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.317** [0.017] -0.020 [0.905]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.036 [0.676] 0.014 [0.919]
Observations 3,622 3,622 3,622 3,622 3,626 3,626 3,626 3,626
R-squared 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.647
GDP p.c. t-1 -1.301* [0.081] -1.289* [0.083] -1.277* [0.086] -1.297* [0.081] 0.947 [0.144] 0.953 [0.140] 0.960 [0.137] 0.957 [0.136]
Population t-1 -3.706* [0.063] -3.721* [0.058] -3.721* [0.058] -3.943** [0.046] 0.087 [0.953] 0.115 [0.938] 0.112 [0.939] 0.082 [0.954]
Polity t-1 -0.102 [0.171] -0.129* [0.082] -0.135* [0.067] -0.156** [0.034] -0.010 [0.807] -0.020 [0.631] -0.029 [0.484] -0.032 [0.462]
DAC aid t-1 0.902*** [0.000] 0.892*** [0.000] 0.887*** [0.000] 0.867*** [0.000] 0.384*** [0.000] 0.376*** [0.000] 0.372*** [0.001] 0.369*** [0.001]
UNGA voting t-1 5.438* [0.086] 4.627 [0.122] 5.092* [0.096] 4.889 [0.110] 3.555* [0.095] 3.373 [0.111] 3.394 [0.107] 3.382 [0.108]
Political Terror t-1 -0.075 [0.657] -0.068 [0.691] -0.098 [0.557] -0.116 [0.485] -0.365*** [0.000] -0.365*** [0.000] -0.382*** [0.000] -0.384*** [0.000]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 0.166* [0.050] 0.060 [0.267]
Core Treaties t-1 0.256* [0.074] 0.146* [0.065]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.730** [0.017] 0.210 [0.278]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.054 [0.822] 0.105 [0.311]
Observations 3,588 3,588 3,588 3,588 3,627 3,627 3,627 3,627
R-squared 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.567 0.586 0.586 0.587 0.587
GDP p.c. t-1 -1.029 [0.211] -1.018 [0.219] -1.032 [0.211] -1.024 [0.217]
Population t-1 -6.834** [0.014] -6.966** [0.013] -6.842** [0.014] -6.775** [0.017]
Polity t-1 -0.120 [0.212] -0.095 [0.307] -0.108 [0.236] -0.103 [0.277]
DAC aid t-1 0.790*** [0.000] 0.802*** [0.000] 0.796*** [0.000] 0.801*** [0.000]
UNGA voting t-1 1.182 [0.578] 0.815 [0.708] 1.079 [0.617] 1.095 [0.613]
Political Terror t-1 -0.195 [0.314] -0.209 [0.279] -0.188 [0.329] -0.184 [0.341]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 -0.165* [0.099]
Core Treaties t-1 -0.106 [0.476]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.215 [0.502]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.034 [0.895]
Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597
R-squared 0.644 0.644 0.643 0.643
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Notes: Dependent variable is bilateral aid commitment. Shown are
the marginal effects at the mean of all other covariates. UNGA voting
refers to the voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly
between the recipient and the respctive donor. DAC aid is the total
aid of all DAC donors except the respective donor whose aid is
analyzed. The estimation method is Poisson Pseude-Maximum-
Likelihood to account for excess zeros in the dependent variable.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values in






(17) (18) (19) (20)




Table A 3: Bilateral aid like-minded countries, interaction, PPML 
 
Political Terror t-1 -0.016 [0.178] -0.042** [0.046] -0.048* [0.053] -0.030 [0.148] -0.056 [0.109] -0.183*** [0.002] -0.193*** [0.002] -0.147*** [0.001]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 -0.010 [0.145] -0.065*** [0.008]
Human Rights Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.004* [0.069] 0.021*** [0.004]
Core Treaties t-1 -0.021 [0.145] -0.103** [0.014]
Core Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.008* [0.077] 0.036*** [0.007]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.008 [0.844] -0.322*** [0.003]
ICCPR & CAT t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.013 [0.306] 0.100*** [0.004]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.015 [0.284] 0.025 [0.551]
Constant 2.169 [0.344] 2.488 [0.281] 2.490 [0.279] 2.663 [0.256] -8.853 [0.220] -8.200 [0.252] -8.947 [0.213] -8.731 [0.233]
Observations 3,564 3,564 3,564 3,564 3,163 3,163 3,163 3,163
R-squared 0.599 0.600 0.601 0.600 0.514 0.515 0.514 0.515
Political Terror t-1 0.016 [0.313] -0.073*** [0.009] -0.086*** [0.004] -0.038 [0.112] -0.017 [0.520] -0.047 [0.296] -0.078 [0.142] -0.049 [0.163]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 -0.028** [0.047] -0.004 [0.846]
Human Rights Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.015*** [0.000] 0.005 [0.365]
Core Treaties t-1 -0.060*** [0.009] -0.027 [0.452]
Core Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.027*** [0.000] 0.015 [0.170]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.173*** [0.002] -0.101 [0.212]
ICCPR & CAT t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.056*** [0.001] 0.032 [0.201]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.037* [0.067] 0.031 [0.278]
Constant -7.288* [0.093] -6.524 [0.118] -6.568 [0.116] -6.992 [0.106] 12.370** [0.029] 12.272** [0.028] 12.455** [0.027] 12.278** [0.030]
Observations 3,592 3,592 3,592 3,592 3,524 3,524 3,524 3,524
R-squared 0.580 0.584 0.583 0.582 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.601
Political Terror t-1 -0.013 [0.706] -0.082 [0.260] -0.086 [0.304] -0.075 [0.202]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 0.013 [0.647]
Human Rights Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.011 [0.208]
Core Treaties t-1 0.029 [0.598]
Core Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.016 [0.337]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.074 [0.580]
ICCPR & CAT t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.052 [0.206]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.073* [0.067]
Constant -4.049 [0.632] -4.848 [0.551] -4.507 [0.579] -4.263 [0.597]
Observations 3,244 3,244 3,244 3,244
R-squared 0.528 0.534 0.533 0.533
(16)
Netherlands Norway
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Notes: All control variables included but not shown here.
Dependent variable is bilateral aid commitment. UNGA voting
refers to the voting behavior in the United Nations General
Assembly between the recipient and the respctive donor. DAC aid
is the total aid of all DAC donors except the respective donor
whose aid is analyzed. The estimation method is Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood to account for excess zeros in the
dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the country




(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Table A 4: Bilateral aid important DAC countries, interaction, PPML 
Political Terror t-1 -0.010** [0.021] -0.019** [0.016] -0.021*** [0.008] -0.016** [0.024] -0.019*** [0.002] -0.033** [0.017] -0.033* [0.055] -0.028** [0.015]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 0.001 [0.679] -0.007 [0.250]
Human Rights Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.001* [0.081] 0.002 [0.217]
Core Treaties t-1 -0.000 [0.968] -0.009 [0.480]
Core Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.002* [0.072] 0.003 [0.375]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 0.007 [0.616] -0.026 [0.382]
ICCPR & CAT t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.005 [0.222] 0.009 [0.336]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.002 [0.706] 0.002 [0.873]
Constant 2.272** [0.011] 2.292** [0.010] 2.314*** [0.009] 2.435*** [0.006] 7.641*** [0.000] 7.811*** [0.000] 7.763*** [0.000] 7.747*** [0.000]
Observations 3,622 3,622 3,622 3,622 3,626 3,626 3,626 3,626
R-squared 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.647
Political Terror t-1 -0.006 [0.657] -0.045* [0.054] -0.054** [0.033] -0.030 [0.126] -0.023*** [0.000] -0.006 [0.612] 0.002 [0.853] -0.014 [0.186]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 -0.004 [0.684] 0.011*** [0.010]
Human Rights Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.007** [0.019] -0.003** [0.038]
Core Treaties t-1 -0.012 [0.531] 0.028*** [0.000]
Core Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.012** [0.019] -0.007*** [0.008]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.000 [0.995] 0.043** [0.049]
ICCPR & CAT t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.021* [0.081] -0.010 [0.191]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.003 [0.873] 0.006 [0.353]
Constant 5.719** [0.013] 6.032*** [0.007] 6.075*** [0.006] 6.301*** [0.006] 1.991 [0.355] 1.721 [0.421] 1.670 [0.432] 1.832 [0.366]
Observations 3,588 3,588 3,588 3,588 3,627 3,627 3,627 3,627
R-squared 0.566 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.586 0.588 0.590 0.588
Political Terror t-1 -0.015 [0.314] -0.021 [0.320] -0.018 [0.463] -0.021 [0.272]
Human Rights Treaties t-1 -0.015 [0.127]
Human Rights Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.001 [0.744]
Core Treaties t-1 -0.010 [0.539]
Core Treaties t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.001 [0.850]
ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.038 [0.384]
ICCPR & CAT t-1*Political Terror t-1 0.008 [0.507]
Core HRTs except ICCPR & CAT t-1 -0.002 [0.913]
Constant 10.808*** [0.002] 11.124*** [0.002] 10.880*** [0.002] 10.855*** [0.003]
Observations 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597
R-squared 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644
United States
Notes: All control variables included but not shown here.
Dependent variable is bilateral aid commitment. UNGA voting
refers to the voting behavior in the United Nations General
Assembly between the recipient and the respctive donor. DAC aid
is the total aid of all DAC donors except the respective donor whose
aid is analyzed. The estimation method is Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum-Likelihood to account for excess zeros in the dependent
variable. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. P-values
in brackets, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
(14) (15) (16)
United Kingdom Japan
(17) (18) (19) (20)
(6) (7) (8)
Germany France
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DAC ODA 3,631 503,000,000 1,000,000,000 0 24,000,000,000
GDP p.c. 3,626 2404.72 4125.78 54.51 61,374.75
Population 3,631 37,800,000 145,000,000 61,742.40 1,340,000,000
Polity 3,417 4.99 3.05 0 10
UNGA Voting 3,631 0.58 0.06 0.42 0.80
Political Terror 3,612 2.66 1.03 1 5
Physical Integrity 3,009 4.31 2.13 0 8
Human Rights Convention Ratification 3,631 6.50 3.86 0 19
Core Treaty Ratification 3,631 4.11 2.20 0 9
ICCPR & CAT Ratification 3,631 1.08 0.83 0 2
Core Treaties  except ICCPR & CAT 
Ratification
3,631 3.03 1.49 0 7
Other Treaties (Instrument) Ratified 3,631 1.86 1.45 0 6
Spatial Effect Human Rights 
Convention Ratification
3,628 5.96 2.71 1.44 11.73
Spatial Effect Core Treaty Ratification 3,628 3.74 1.57 0.79 6.40
Spatial Effect ICCPR & CAT Ratification 3,628 1.01 0.44 0.17 1.72
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excluding: Agreement establishing the Fund for the Development of the 
Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean  as  it has only 
a regional focus and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on a communications procedure as it was adopted 
only in 2011
Core Treaty Ratification Count measure of ratification of the nine core treaties  on human rights 
(see conventions in Table A II.5)
ICCPR & CAT Ratification Count measure on the ratification of the ICCPR and the CAT
Political Terror
United Nations Treaty Database 
(2013)
